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LEADING AIRMEN: 






The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate systems thinking and apply 
these principles to Air Force leadership.  The paper offers squadron commanders, in 
particular, a primer in systems thinking that will enable them to approach unit leadership 
challenges from a systems perspective.  The first two chapters examine the origins of 
systems thinking and present a holistic organizational model as the basis for problem 
analysis.  Chapter II illustrates the importance of correctly interpreting the external 
environment and dealing with external influencers.  Chapter III applies these concepts 
and introduces a systems approach to financial leadership.  Finally, Chapter IV examines 
the roots of continuous process improvement and offers suggestions for commander 
implementation of Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st century.  This project is 
written directly to Air Force squadron commanders.  It is the author’s hope these topics 
will help spur commanders around the Air Force to challenge their mental frameworks 
towards developing and better enabling Airmen leadership to face the challenges of the 
twenty first century.  
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As a service, the Air Force struggled into existence nearly 50 years after the 
invention of the airplane.  Prior to this, early airpower proponents struggled to convince 
the defense institution that the airplane should be treated as much more than just a 
technological advancement for supporting ground troops.  While hindsight makes it 
difficult to deny the dramatic impact of air power on the modern world, these struggles 
seem to indicate defense leaders of the time experienced barriers to understanding the 
true potential unfolding before them. This failure to see a revolutionary change in war 
fighting was the result of a myopic view of the defense mechanism by those most trained 
to detect and exploit such scenarios.   It is unlikely airpower would have been nearly as 
effective if the Air Force had not escaped the Army’s parochial grasp.  For reasons we 
will never fully know, the defense institution of the early twentieth century viewed the 
organization in a way that may have hindered the analysis of the changing environment 
and new capabilities.   
Lest we think this is a problem of the past, the Air Force of today faces similar 
challenges from elusively defined threats, the development of new technologies (e.g., 
space assets, unmanned aerial vehicles, information warfare, etc.), and increasing 
budgetary pressures.  Like our predecessors, each of us views these situations through a 
lens or framework that shapes how we interpret the impact these scenarios will have on 
our organizations.1 For a decision maker, these frameworks can be either a window to 
opportunity or a barrier to understanding.  As such, Airmen leaders must strive to develop 
the most accurate frameworks possible in order to deal with the challenges facing the Air 
Force today.  
To that end, this handbook challenges Airmen to question and improve the 
frameworks they use to understand the world around them.  The theoretical foundation 
used in this study is systems thinking and acting i.e., a system being a set of interrelated 
                                                 
1 Lee Bolman, and Terrence Deal, Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice and leadership (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997). 
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components working towards a common purpose.2 The goal and central hypothesis of 
systems thinking revolves around the concept of fit and congruence, or alignment.  In 
short, the fit of crucial components or variables determines organizational performance, 
including the extent to which an organization’s strategy and design fit the external 
environment in which it operates.3  
This paper offers squadron commanders, in particular, a primer in systems 
thinking that will enable them to approach unit leadership challenges from a systems 
perspective.  Chapter I examines the origins of systems thinking and presents a holistic 
organizational model as the basis for problem analysis.  Chapter II illustrates the 
importance of correctly interpreting the external environment and dealing with external 
influencers.  With this solid foundation, Chapter III takes a systems approach to financial 
leadership.  Finally, Chapter IV examines the roots of continuous process improvement 
and offers suggestions for commander implementation of Air Force Smart Operations for 
the 21st century.  It is the author’s hope these topics will help spur commanders around 
the Air Force to challenge their mental frameworks towards developing and better 
enabling Airmen leadership to face the challenges of the twenty first century.  
                                                 
2  Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990).  
3  David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman, "A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior," 
Organizational Dynamics 9, no. 2  (Autumn 1980), 35-51 (accessed 8/30/2007).  
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II. SYSTEMS THINKING 
Due to the generally accepted view of the increasing complexity of life, most of 
our educational experiences have taught us how to break down systems into smaller sub 
parts and then examine those isolated pieces to simplify understanding (reductionism).4 
For example, rather than viewing the whole human body we reduce it into smaller 
systems like the pulmonary and skeletal systems.  We further break these systems down 
to cellular and muscular functions to specialize our understanding. Unfortunately, by 
reducing the whole system in this manner it can become difficult to see how these pieces 
relate and impact one another.  This can lead to a flawed analogy for reality and an 
incomplete framework for viewing a system when problems arise.  Human systems, such 
as an Air Force squadron, are no different.  To the extent that an analytical framework is 
incomplete or insufficient, then describing and predicting behaviors and outcomes are 
reduced and real improvements illusive.  All the while, leaders and managers may fail to 
see the underlying systemic reasons for what is occurring within their organizations.  
Like a heart specialist who fails to clarify the importance of diet, organizational problems 
can be missed or mis-diagnosed until dysfunction or bankruptcy occurs.   
A. THE ORIGINS OF SYSTEMS THINKING 
Systems theory is not a modern-day concept but the culmination of centuries of 
thought.  Many have quoted Aristotle’s statement, “The whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts,” without realizing it as a basic definition of the systems framework. While the 
truth in this statement is not difficult to understand, it can be very difficult to prove.  





                                                 
4  Newman S. Peery Jr., "General Systems Theory: An Inquiry into its Social Philosophy," Academy of 
Management Journal 15, no. 4 (12, 1972), 495 (accessed 8/30/2007). 
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mathematically, the scientific method was derived in which complex problems were 
reduced into smaller, more understandable sub-parts and processes with fewer variables 
than the original problem. 5  
While an incredible amount of progress in all fields has been made using this 
method, the gap between studying the parts of a system and seeing the connectedness of 
the parts into the larger whole can result in our conclusions being incomplete.  Knowing 
this, we mentally attempt to overcome this problem by reassembling the parts after we 
have analyzed them to try to see the bigger picture.  Intuitively we know, however, that 
the actual reality we are studying is much more than just the reassembled pieces.  It was 
in this gap between the reductionism of the scientific method and the complexity of 
reality that systems theory was born.  While early work focused on physical and 
biological systems, over the last 50 years systems theory has been applied to many 
fields.6 When applied to social systems, systems thinking and organizational systems 
models provide a framework and set of tools to see the workplace with all its 
connectedness rather than as dissected functional stovepipes shown on glossy 
organizational charts.  
No Air Force squadron is independent to itself.  Instead, it takes in inputs from the 
environment, processes them and then adds products back into the larger system. For 
example, a flying Wing takes in pilots, maintainers, aircraft etc., and transforms them 
through a training process to provide combat capability to the DoD and the Nation. When 
a system makes these exchanges with the environment it is said to be open.  Examples of 
open systems can be easily seen in the physical environment all around us and make great 
illustrations of systems thinking.  For example, biologists discuss how small, unrelated 
events can adversely affect an “ecosystem” even when immediate consequences seem 
miniscule.   The concept is that while the disturbance may not appear to directly impact a 
sub-part, there exists an interrelationship among the parts that can impact results, i.e., 
cause and effect are often not close together in time and space.   
                                                 
5  Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, "The History and Status of General Systems Theory," Academy of 
Management Journal 15, no. 4, December 1972, 407 (accessed 8/30/2007). 
6  Senge, The Fifth Discipline. 
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Environmentalists often draw from this principle when denouncing seemingly 
insignificant changes in the world as the precursor to much larger problems.  The 
ongoing debate over global climate change is a perfect example. When we have a 
reductionist mindset, it is easy to miss signs pointing towards future system-wide 
problems.  For instance, it took decades for scientists to understand the consequences 
when a small, distant nation chooses to cut down its rainforests.  For the rainforest nation, 
clearing the land provides economic opportunity and improves the lives of its people 
without any clear, direct, negative impact.  Likewise, reductionist thinking would not 
even register this event when analyzing countries thousands of miles away.  Not until 
symptoms in non-rainforest nations reached a level that the existence of a problem was 
undeniable would these nations begin to look for solutions.  Unfortunately, this delayed 
recognition of the problem may limit the range of viable solutions.  In this case, it was 
not that scientists did not understand the dynamics of rainforests and the CO2 oxygen 
cycle, but rather our frameworks failed us and prevented us from appreciating the greater 
impacts on the balance of the world’s ecosystem.   
Ultimately, any system in question will strive for a balanced equilibrium that is a 
sustainable system wide stability, in ways an analysis of the sub-parts may not predict 
regardless of how well we understand the sub-parts processes.  A human organization, 
like an Air Force squadron, is no different than an environmental ecosystem in the 
interrelatedness of its parts and a natural tendency towards a state of equilibrium.  Just as 
viewing the impact of cutting down rainforests in the Congo cannot be understood by 
isolating the event, neither can organizations be fully understood without viewing the 
interrelatedness of systems within which they operate.   
Borrowed from thermodynamics, another important system concept is entropy.  
All physical and biological systems will tend towards disorder and decay.  Because 
human systems like Air Force squadrons are not formed through natural processes, they 
are said to be contrived systems and have the potential to overcome this tendency towards 
decay.7  This provides an opportunity for organizations to survive long beyond the 
                                                 
7  Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosenzweig, "General System Theory: Applications for Organization 
and Management," Academy of Management Journal 15, no. 4, December 1972, 447 (accessed 8/30/2007).  
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pioneers who created them.  This premise should lead us to take a long-term outlook on 
all of our important organizations.  Unfortunately, without a systems view, many 
organizational decisions are reached from a short- term perspective.  This can be 
exaggerated in a squadron when the typical length of command is two years and 
personnel are frequently replaced.  Unfortunately, short-term decision making contributes 
to decay and reduces the organization’s prospects for long-term survival.  Failing to 
realize organizations are open, living systems, attempting to reach homeostasis and defy 
entropy will hinder one’s ability to effectively lead within the system.8 When properly 
applied, the body of systems thinking can help the leader promote long-run 
organizational effectiveness and identify root causes of problems before they undermine 
system integrity. 
While volumes have been written on the systems framework, it is sufficient to 
realize that most contemporary training and education leads us to reduce systems into 
small pieces often to the point we no longer recognize their proper contextual places in 
the original system.  In contrast, general systems theory assumes all systems are governed 
by universal principles of organization and can be analyzed at a holistic level.9 Systems 
thinking provides a theoretical mindset and model for overcoming the pitfalls of a 
myopic reductionist view.  Practically, shifting perspective to view organizations as open 
and living systems can help a commander recognize and anticipate the impacts of subtle 
changes both outside and within the squadron. With this background, the following 
section provides an organizational systems model that a commander can apply to any Air 
Force squadron.  
                                                 
8 For an in-depth discussion on the criteria for living systems see James G. Miller, Living Systems 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).  
9  F. Heylighen, "Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach," http://pcp.lanl.gov/sysappr.html (accessed 
07/10/ 2007).  
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B. AN ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS MODEL 
In order to illustrate these concepts, it is necessary to develop an organizational 
systems model.  Shown below in Figure 1 approach to viewing an open organizational 
system: 
 
Figure 1.   Organizational Systems Model After 10  
Unlike a traditional job-based organizational chart, this diagram begins to 
illustrate the general flow of processes a squadron goes through as it accomplishes its 
mission.  Because the system is open, the model includes what is happening beyond the 
squadron as a critical component for overall system analysis.  Labeled as the external 
environment, the concept of interpreting and interacting with the external environment is 
so critical for organizational leadership it will be developed more fully in Chapter II.  
Suffice it to say, we ignore careful understanding of the external environment at our own 
unit’s peril and will not likely succeed in command without improving our vision of 
external forces.   
                                                 
10 The author has drawn on several sources for the development of the organizational model.  Work 
from Nadler and Tushman, A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior, 35-51, Harold Leavitt, 
William Dill and Henry Eyring, The Organizational World (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovancih, Inc., 
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Next in the flow, every organization needs fuel to survive, and for the squadron, 
this comes from the inputs it receives.  These include tangible resources such as capital, 
property, equipment, and people as well as intangible resources such as unit history and 
leadership.  Tangible resources, such as a unit’s budget authority, are always in short 
supply for Air Force squadrons.  As a result, there is an additional responsibility for 
leadership in charge of wise stewardship of public resources that goes beyond simply 
expending inputs in “profitable” ventures.  Chapter III will address a systems framework 
for managing scarce public resources.  
People in the organization are an obvious but often misunderstood input into the 
system.  Unlike fixed resources, people have a capacity to change making their ability to 
add value to the organization variable.  Recognizing Airmen in this way illustrates the 
imperative to develop them within the squadron rather than take them purely as an 
interchangeable fixed asset to be plugged into a pre-designed task.  As the Air Force 
Chief of Staff, General Moseley has made “developing Airmen” one of the top three 
priorities for the service.11 In a world increasingly driven by knowledge workers, this 
direction makes sense when viewing the organization from a systems perspective.  Under 
a more mechanistic view of the organization, a leader would be tempted to ignore 
development of lower echelons of the organization, preferring to educate Airmen only to 
the level required for their specialized function. 
Another important input in the organizational model is the history of the unit.12  
As open, dynamic, living systems, squadrons have a corporate history much like a 
person.  This history contributes to the unit’s overall resources from which it draws on to 
accomplish its mission.  Key leaders and strategic decisions in the unit’s past have helped 
create current organizational norms, attitudes, and values. With squadron commanders 
rotating on a biannual basis, most commanders may not have a good understanding of 
this history, and may need to research the unit to develop an understanding for this 
                                                 
11  Michael Moseley, "Wingmen for Life," Air Force Portal June 2007 (accessed 8/10/2007).  
12  Nadler and Tushman, A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior, 35-51  
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invisible input into the organizational process.  History often helps explain the informal 
structures and attitudes prevalent in every system and can be of great insight to a 
commander.  
Leadership also falls into the input category and has an inherent responsibility to 
set the direction for the organization.  Given a particular organization’s current external 
environment, leaders must help formulate the goals, values, rules, vision, policies, and 
overarching mission the organization is expected to accomplish.  Often termed as an 
organization’s strategy, a commander must choose how the squadron will accomplish its 
mission in light of its resources and placement within the external environment.  Strategy 
is not the same as an assigned mission statement.  It is an active and adaptable position of 
how the unit will accomplish the mission based on the situation today and the leader’s 
vision of the future.  Strategy also helps save resources by defining for the unit what it 
will choose not to accomplish. Strained by limited resources and increasing requirements, 
military organizations often adopt an attitude that says the unit will do more with less and 
accept any mission.   While admirable, this complete flexibility is the opposite of strategy 
and communicates to the organization that regardless of inputs, results must be 
maintained or even increased.  Some of these demands may be met by increasing 
operational effectiveness and enabling increased productivity.  Over the long run, 
however adopting a strategy of complete flexibility without regard to inputs is fatalistic 
and can put strains on the unit that will have to be relieved in order to reach a sustainable 
position.  It is worthy to note that direction setting by the leader is not a direct output, but 
merely describes the leader’s viewpoint and hopes for the organization.  Ultimately, the 
results produced by the system will show whether the leader was effective at impacting 
the system by obtaining the desired results. 
2. Throughput 
Once inside the organization itself, the transformation of inputs into goods and 
services begins.  This “throughput” process, describes the general design of the 
organization.  Many models have been built to explain this process, but generally what 
occurs can be seen through five mechanisms: tasks, people, structure, processes, and 
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technology.13   These mechanisms define how the inputs will be converted into the final 
product.  These categories are the target of most efforts at improving operational 
effectiveness within an organization and generally have at least some measure of 
variability the leader can impact.  For instance, while squadron manning is subject to an 
assigned billet system, individuals within the unit can be tasked outside their designated 
job to accomplish duties as desired by the leadership.  Similarly, while still subject to a 
vertical chain of command structure, a unit may choose to form small work teams with 
leadership based on criteria other than rank.  Fighter aircraft formations are often directed 
by younger officers leading wingmen who outrank them for that assigned mission.  Air 
Force Smart Operations for the 21st century (AFSO 21) is a program that aims to improve 
throughput process efficiencies by eliminating or re-designing elements within the 
organization that have limited value-adding ability.  As the lowest level of command 
leadership, squadron commanders may have the greatest insight into AFSO 21- type 
improvements if trained to view the organization holistically.   
There are many ways to describe an organization’s throughput process, but what 
is most critical for the leader is to understand the interconnectedness of the sub-parts of 
the system.  As shown in the Figure 1, there is a web of combinations of impacts when 
the elements of design are viewed in this manner.  There is no one correct way to design 
a human social system.  Squadrons with the exact same mission may achieve similar 
results with very different internal designs.  What is most important is how well the 
design elements relate to one another.  When the elements of the organization are 
designed in a cohesive manner, the system is said to exhibit a high level of congruence. 14  
Perfect congruence means all elements of the system are operating in harmony and the 
relationships of the variables of design fit well and are supportive of one another.  A 
healthy body is a congruent system and has reached a positive balanced equilibrium. 
One simple example of the fit of design variables can be seen in the way a 
squadron rewards performance for its officers.  While it seems obvious we should reward 
                                                 
13  Leavitt, Dill and Eyring, The Organizational World  
14  Nadler and Tushman, A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior, 35-51  
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those behaviors we find desirable and discourage those we dislike, organizations often 
fail to align rewards with objectives.  An organization that wants to move to team-based 
work projects should not evaluate individuals the same as one focused on individual 
effort.  For instance, Air Force Officer Performance Reports that stress numerical 
stratification against one’s peers as a primary means for promotion, by nature, discourage 
collaborative effort.  Neither individual or team effort is necessarily right or wrong, but 
what is important is the congruence of the variables with the desired outcome.  Systems 
that reward one outcome, while hoping for something entirely different, are prevalent in 
all walks of society and violate the principle of design congruence. 15   
When designed well, the activities occurring within the organization will be 
aligned from start to finish and fit into a tightly connected activity map directly 
supporting the desired outcomes.  While benchmarking has become a popular consulting 
tool, world- class organizations in both the private and government sectors are often 
difficult to replicate due to their high levels of congruence.  An organization may copy a 
particular process or procedure, but if the entire organizational system does not align with 
these changes, the unit is unlikely to experience the gains from the benchmarked system.  
As a macro example, air forces around the world have yet to match the USAF in 
capability despite clear efforts to do so.   While some will say the reason is our people or 
training, others will say it is our technology.  Still others may point to our organizational 
structure and delineated doctrinal concepts.  With sufficient funds, foreign air forces 
could replicate these individual design elements exactly and still not match the USAF in 
capability. This can partly be attributed to an Air Force system that has reaped the 
advantages of design congruence.  Because there are no perfect human organizations, 
every Air Force squadron can be improved when commanders develop and implement 
strategies to improve congruence within their units.  
                                                 
15  Steven Kerr, "On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B." The Academy of Management 
Executive, no. February 1995 (accessed 6/10/2007).  
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3. Results 
Once the inputs have been transformed, an open system produces results that can 
be seen outside the squadron itself.  These results come in the form of visible results, 
such as goods and services, as well as less tangible results like squadron culture.  
The most visible outputs of the system are the goods and services the organization 
provides.  For an Air Force squadron these outputs should be directly related to the 
assigned mission statement.  Squadron commanders need to remain mindful of how their 
squadron fits into the larger Air Force system when developing unit goals and objectives, 
or the outputs they achieve may not support the overall Air Force mission effectively.  
While squadron missions can vary dramatically, it is essential for every Air Force to 
attempt maximize combat capability.  Because of the larger mission of the USAF, this is 
true whether the unit is an operational fighter squadron or a financial services squadron.  
This places an additional responsibility to reach mission objectives while also utilizing 
the larger Air Force enterprise resources as effectively as possible.  When a leader sets a 
direction aligned with the unit mission and couples it with this maxim, the larger Air 
Force system will be improved.  A commander should expect to be measured by the 
unit’s ability to achieve the desired outputs. 
As an open system, another result of the system process is the intended and 
unintended outcomes produced by the system.  System outcomes can be seen visibly on 
the nightly news programs.  When the U.S. Military toppled the Iraqi regime, the 
President declared “Mission Accomplished.”  On one level, this statement was true, as 
the mission the military system had been tasked to complete was accomplished.   Other 
outcomes of that system output were also expelled into the external environment.  
Clearly, one intended political outcome was to illustrate to the world the U.S. resolve to 
pursue its interests in the Global War on Terror.  At the same time, an unintended 
consequence was a growing backlash of anti-American sentiment, particularly in the 
Muslim world.   
This example is not meant to stir controversy, but to illustrate how important it is 
for a leader to anticipate both the intended and unintended consequences of a system’s 
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performance. The feedback loop in the diagram illustrates this principle.  A leader must 
constantly monitor the system results and try to limit the amount of negative exchanges 
with the surrounding environment, or the unit may be adversely affected in the long run.   
Similarly, every organization also exudes from itself a certain, observable culture.  
Unlike the internal design congruence of a system, a leader cannot directly change the 
culture of the organization since it is a by product of the system itself.  Many leaders 
failing to realize the difference between these stages in the conversion process have 
attempted to direct cultural changes by verbal edict.  As most of us have seen, these types 
of mandates rarely accomplish the leader’s goals.  As a by-product, culture can be 
changed, but only by going back to the inputs of the system (people, resources, history, 
leadership) and the design of the organization and seeking to realign the root incentives 
forming the basis for the current culture.  Lastly, leaders must remember that culture not 
only affects the organization, but elements of a squadron’s culture will also be visible by 
the external environment.  While still acceptable within an organization, it is possible for 
the external environment to change and no longer find a squadron’s culture tolerable.  
The Navy’s Tailhook incident is an example of an acceptable culture inside an 
organization causing problems for the organization when viewed by outside stakeholders.  
During the feedback process, a leader needs to assess the organizations culture against the 
environment it operates within in order to avoid such clashes and the damage they cause 
for the organization. 
C. APPLICATIONS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS MODEL 
With a basic understanding of systems thinking and an organizational systems 
model, a squadron commander can begin to view the unit through a more holistic 
framework and use this vision as a guide to assessing the unit’s performance. The 
framework illustrates how the whole system is interconnected and impacted by the 
external environment.  As a result, when changes are made in the system, consequences 
will occur in areas beyond where the original change occurred.   
A common occurrence in squadron leadership is to identify a situation that is not 
in line with a desired outcome, and immediately set out to correct the issue.  While the 
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problem may be that simple, it is more likely the leader has identified a symptom to a 
problem and not the root of the problem itself.  If we make a habit of solving symptoms 
rather than root problems the negative impact on overall system effectiveness will likely 
be greater than if we had delayed a correction to seek the root cause. As a simple 
example, an increase in safety incidents, or a rise in Airmen tardiness, may be observed 
symptoms facing a squadron commander.  Taken by itself the solution could be to re-
invigorate the safety program or increase punishments for late arrivals.  While these 
solutions may help the immediate situation, it is also possible these problems are 
symptoms of demands placed elsewhere on the system that are impacting safety and 
performance.  A change in the external environment, such as rising operational demands, 
may be closer to the root of the problem than the observed symptoms.  While treating the 
symptoms may give the leader a sense of being proactive, it may do little more than 
frustrate an already strained system and mask root problems that need addressing.  
Eventually, the problem will resurface, and the consequences will likely be greater than 
when first identified.     
Rather than wasting resources solving symptoms, commanders can apply systems 
thinking to look for root causes.  When problems arise, the leader should scan the system 
for changes that have moved the system out of balance.  Variations may be found in the 
external environment or the inputs that are entering the system.  Likewise, performance 
measures can be analyzed to look for changes in the results the organization is producing.  
Lastly, constantly monitoring the squadron’s throughput process, focusing on design 
congruence, can help identify root causes and opportunities before their impacts ripple 
throughout the organization.  
Seeing the unit as a whole and recognizing interconnectedness is another tool a 
leader can use to aid in problem analysis and obtainment of objectives.  As we know, 
human systems are continuously changing and remarkably complex, making leadership a 
constant challenge.  Understanding that the whole is truly greater than the sum of the 
parts and attempting to expand one’s mental models will help explain some of this 
complexity and improve the quality of Airmen leadership. 
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D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, general systems theory and a basic systems model for the 
organization have been introduced.  While reducing systems to sub-parts has some 
advantages, leaders must be leery of a myopic view that overlooks how these small 
pieces affect the entire system.  Systems’ thinking acknowledges the interconnectedness 
of these parts and attempts to illustrate causal relationships by examining the whole 
rather than just the sub-parts.   This principle can be found in natural biological systems 
as well as in human systems, such as an Air Force squadron.  Identifying the squadron as 
an open and living system, we recognize the unit as having specified inputs such as the 
environment, resources, people, history, and leadership.  These inputs are transformed 
through our people, structure, tasks, and technology to create results that are exchanged 
back with the environment.  The better the congruence of the variables in the system the 
more likely the organization is to operate effectively.  The leader’s challenge is to use 
these system tools to interpret the external environment and the organizations outputs, 
and set in motion a direction that will most align the system variables into a tightly knit 
activity map where the inputs, throughputs and results are operating with a high level of 
congruence.  As a model, this is but one of many tools a commander can employ to help 
the unit, and should be blended with the leader’s experience, managerial skills, and 
intuition to best direct the squadron towards successful mission accomplishment.  The 
next chapter will expand on this framework to illustrate how a squadron commander can 
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III. INTERPRETING THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Anyone who has witnessed a military change of command ceremony cannot help 
but be impressed by the grandeur of it all.  Steeped in heritage, the ceremony represents 
the passing of authority from one leader to the next and can be of great significance to the 
unit and the leaders involved.  Over the course of a just a few minutes, responsibility 
changes hands, and the outgoing commander steps aside while assuring the squadron it 
will continue to prosper under this new leader.  With characteristic military confidence, 
the new commander takes the stage to outline his/her vision for the future.  To watch it all 
unfold, future success for the squadron seems to be a foregone conclusion.  After all the 
congratulations are said and done, however, a thoughtful new commander realizes just 
how many forces and factors may be beyond their direct control.  While his predecessor’s 
command may have been during a time of peace, his may be one of war.  Generous 
budgets and manpower levels may shrink following a change in national political power.  
The very mission of the unit may become obsolete as new technologies emerge or 
competitive outsourcing proves to be more efficient.  
In truth, when organizations are understood as open systems, the environment 
around the unit plays a crucial role in shaping its overall effectiveness, effectiveness 
being defined as goal accomplishment and adaptability.  While a squadron commander 
may “assume command” and bear ultimate responsibility for the performance of the unit, 
he/she never really gains complete control over the forces that will impact these 
responsibilities.  While a new commander should exude optimism, understanding and 
managing this underlying premise is sobering and daunting. How well the squadron 
handles this gap between what can and cannot be controlled often determines how the 
unit actually performs.  Fortunately, systems thinking can help squadron commanders 
bridge this gap and develop a strategy for both interpreting and interacting with the 
external environment surrounding the unit.  With this in mind, this section presents a 
framework for squadron commanders to view the influencers surrounding the unit and 
develop a strategy for coexisting and succeeding with the world outside the organization.  
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A. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
“No plan has ever survived contact with the enemy.” 
-Unknown 
If organizations did not interact with the world around them, successful leadership 
would be much simpler.  Leaders would align internal processes to maximize 
performance and produce consistent results year after year. Unfortunately, as the wise 
strategist above relates, once the perfect plan meets the outside world new variables are 
introduced and success now requires the system to take into account the context in which 
it has been placed.  The more unstable the environment, the greater the impacts the 
organization can expect to feel.  
For many reasons, both the level of environmental instability and the pace of life 
have drastically increased over the last several decades. The incredible improvements in 
computer processing power illustrate this phenomenon.  Imagine trying to accomplish 
today’s common workplace tasks on the 64K computers found in offices of the late 
1980s.  With this increasing pace has come a corresponding increase in change, 
complexity, and uncertainty in the external environment.  These changes no longer make 
it realistic for an organization to make a ten-year plan and expect it to remain relevant.  
Many cite these changes as ushering in the age of the knowledge worker, where the 
ability of our workforce to harness rapid changes in information, will determine success 
in this new climate. 16 
Systems thinking can be applied to help understand this complexity by treating 
the external environment as another relationship required to be seen holistically.  When a 
system is open, its very survival depends on its ability to keep a positive exchange of 
inputs and results with the external environment.  This requires a measure of adaptability 
on the part of the system in order to continue to succeed despite changing conditions.17  
                                                 
16  Alex Bennet and David Bennet, Chapter 62: Designing the Knowledge Organization of the Future: 
The Intelligent Complex Adaptive System Springer Science & Business Media B.V. / Books, 2004), 623-
638.  
17  Nadler and Tushman, A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior, 35-51.  
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While this may seem simple, history is replete with examples of both public and private 
organizations that disappeared for failing to adapt to the world around them.  In this era 
of instant access and transparency of information, we should expect organizations to be 
punished even quicker when they fail to adapt to the changing environment.  Not 
surprisingly, many organizational scholars advise leaders to see the external environment 
as the first level of analysis before attempting to improve organizational effectiveness 
measures.18 
Since an Air Force squadron is not self-sustaining it makes sense to sort through 
the array of forces outside the unit to attempt to make the same relationship connectivity 
described in the first chapter.  It is not hard to see that the squadron could easily be 
considered as part of a larger Air Force Wing system, and the Wing part of a Major 
Command system and so forth.  Theoretically, it could even be said that all of our 
individual Service systems are part of a larger super system, i.e., seeing a hierarchy of 
systems.  What is most important is not the exact boundary, but the understanding of the 
exchanges occurring between the system in question, the overlapping systems above it, 
and the external forces surrounding it. The basic principles of systems thinking remain 
the same – the fit of the major variables determines performance.  For this analysis, it is 
sufficient to consider an Air Force squadron as a complete system having porous 
boundaries with the rest of the world.  
As a squadron commander, the challenge is to create an organization that both 
sees and correctly interprets changes in the surroundings.  This requires the ability to  
understand the content and context of what is observed and to be able to see correlated 
consequences of these insights.19  This is the essence of interpreting the external 
environment. 
                                                 
18  Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, 2nd ed. (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1978).  
19  Kast and Rosenzweig, General System Theory: Applications for Organization and Management, 
447.   
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B. BUILDING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Academic management literature often refers to the process of looking outward 
from the organization as scanning the external environment.  A more familiar phrase for 
Airmen is situational awareness (SA).  Airmen can be said to have SA when they 
correctly understand their current position in relation to all the relevant variables at any 
given moment in time and respond accordingly.  For example, after a mission, fighter 
pilots examine their varying levels of SA during an air battle to determine whether their 
corresponding actions were correct.  When it is determined an error was made because of 
poor situational awareness, the reason for the low SA is sought out so that in future 
battles the pilot will better understand what cues to look for.  Since two battles are never 
the same, an improved ability to interpret the environment (situational awareness) is 
much more valuable than a standard solution to a previous problem.   
Gaining experience in building this SA requires several things.  First, you must 
know where you are starting from and be competent in your business.  Just as an F-22 
will not be lethal in the hands of a Cessna pilot, neither can a squadron be effective if its 
Airmen and leaders are not competent.  Next, you must recognize that most choices are 
contingent, meaning they depend on the circumstances in which the problem occurs.  
Qualified, but inexperienced workers in all fields are often frustrated when they apply a 
textbook solution only to find it does not work in their situation.  Do not interpret this to 
mean there is no place for principle-based leadership and decision making.  If this were 
the case, leaders and organizations would be driven by the environment and lose all 
identity and autonomy as a separate system.  Every individual and organization is 
founded on cornerstone principles that help define its existence.  For any Air Force 
squadron, these would include the Air Force core values of Integrity, Service before Self, 
and Excellence in All We Do.  When a squadron faces a situation violating these values it 
must side with principles or risk losing its identity.  Correspondingly, an open 
organization would be wise not to constrain itself with too many non-negotiable ideas or 
risk the ability to adapt to its surroundings.  In recognizing this conflict between 
contingency thinking and principled thinking, a leader must understand the unit’s core 
principles and weigh them against the changing environment.  Whenever a situation 
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occurs that does not violate this small set of principles and values, an organization can 
approach problems, causes and solutions from a contingency perspective. 
Lastly, building situational awareness requires selectively filtering the 
information entering the organization from the environment.  This filtering process is 
perhaps the most difficult and requires practice.  In today’s fast-paced world, if this 
process is not done well a leader and the organization can be paralyzed by the constant 
deluge of information or harmed for failing to spot valuable insights.20  This is where a 
holistic, systems thinking mindset can help a squadron to see interrelationships and avoid 
ignoring potentially relevant environmental cues.  Consider this simple but poignant 
example.  The pay-day loan industry provides short term loans with a typical term of two 
weeks for amounts between $100 and $1500 dollars.  These loans give the borrower 
quick cash in return for a claim against their next paycheck.  When annualized, the fees 
for these loans are an incredible 390% to 900%.  At the end of two weeks the borrower 
must repay the loan plus fees or take out another loan to carry forward the balance.  Less 
than one percent of pay day loan borrowers are able to repay these loans and have to take 
another loan.  On average the typical borrower pays back $793 for an original $325 dollar 
loan.21 
Looking back, few squadron commanders probably understood this business 
model or noticed the rise of this burgeoning $28 billion dollar industry. It is likely, 
however, that most commanders around the country did notice the pay day loan shops 
popping up outside military bases.  The question is how many made a connection 
between this change in the environment and the squadrons they led.  It is a sad fact that 
many of our enlisted families struggle to make ends meet every month and often have 
limited access to stable credit sources.  The reason these business were showing up was 
because some of their most profitable customers were driving on base every day.  
Lacking sound financial training and faced with mounting money problems, many 
                                                 
20  Bennet and Bennet, Chapter 62: Designing the Knowledge Organization of the Future: The 
Intelligent Complex Adaptive System, 623-638.  
21  Wikipedia, "Payday Loan," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payday_loan#_note-usatodaymilitary 
(accessed 8/2/2007).  
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Airmen turned to pay day loans to get by.  Unfortunately, this was not a solution for most 
Airmen but the beginning of a damaging debt cycle resulting in personal crisis’s ranging 
from marital problems to criminal activity.  Eventually, these types of personnel 
problems resulted in noticeably decreased readiness.  Ultimately it was this decrease in 
readiness that successfully persuaded Congress to limit fees charged to military personnel 
to 36% claiming predatory lending practices were ruining servicemen’s finances, 
impacting security clearances, and reducing available personnel for deployment to 
combat zones.22 
The point is, when pay day loan shops entered the military base environment 
nearly a decade ago, it was a substantial event that would eventually impact every 
organization in the Air Force, illustrating how cause and effect can be far apart in time 
and space.  Unfortunately, many failed to see the relationship between these loan sharks 
and the organization and filtered out this environmental change.  Only when readiness 
measures dropped did the service begin to see the real impact of pay day loan shops.   
The clear lesson is that the process by which we filter information is crucial, thereby 
requiring squadron leaders to think systemically when assessing the environment 
surrounding the unit.  The clear lines of responsibility built into the chain of command 
may make some commander’s apprehensive to do this for fear of overstepping their 
bounds.  While there is definitely a time and place for a focused “stay in your lane” 
mentality, skillful practitioners realize the importance of discerning the difference when 
building SA on the external environment.   
Because interrelationships can be difficult to see, a commander simply cannot be 
the sole source of situational awareness for the squadron.  More appropriately, the whole 
squadron would need to be trained to become human sensors for the organization as they 
go about their daily lives.23  When this principle is applied, Air Force squadrons can 
generate a great potential advantage due to the breadth of experiences each airman brings 
to a unit.  Moving every few years, traveling abroad, and witnessing how other parts of 
                                                 
22  William Welch, "Law Caps Interest on Payday Advances to Service Members," USA Today 
Online, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-17-paydayloans_x.htm (accessed 8/2/2007).  
23  Leavitt, Dill and Eyring, The Organizational World  
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the Air Force system operate in different environments helps sharpen these sensory skills.  
As Airmen are exposed to systems thinking, they can review past experiences and see 
how they have already observed the connectedness of the external environment with Air 
Force units.  Accordingly, these Airmen, if given voice by their commanders, can now be 
powerful sources of knowledge for the squadron.   
C. INTERACTING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT 
Once we expand our vision to begin to see how the world around us is connected 
with the organization, we can develop strategies to interact with these influencers.  While 
much has been written on this topic, the focus of this section is to implement ideas from 
various models deemed most applicable to an Air Force commander.  As our Airmen 
become external organizational sensors, the information they provide can be sorted into 
at least two categories: threats, and stakeholders.   
Airmen appear most tuned to detecting threats from the external environment.  
The very nature of the Department of Defense is to repel threats from harming our nation, 
so it is not surprising that military leaders are keen to sensing threats.  In general, an 
external threat can be identified as an entity whose current operating practices puts the 
organization’s objectives at risk.  As a systems thinker realizes, threats can be both direct 
and indirect.  An enemy of the state, such as Al Qaeda, could be considered a direct 
threat.  It is not just our enemies who can become a threat.  Even our allies may become 
indirect threats when their actions jeopardize our objectives. 
A caution for commanders is to jump too quickly to categorize all external 
influencers with whom they disagree as threats.  What may initially be perceived as a 
threat may be turned into an opportunity or a collaborative stakeholder if common ground 
can be achieved.  For instance, in the pay-day loan example, had local commanders 
engaged these businesses earlier, there may have been an opportunity to help young 
Airmen with financial struggles.  After all, pay-day loans provided some Airmen with a 
means to get by when they had no other financial options. With the new legislation, this 
option is now gone as pay day lenders will stop serving military customers.  Somewhere 
between the extremes of predatory lending and no lending, it is possible a cooperative 
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relationship with the pay-day lenders could have been developed allowing them to 
coexist with military bases under a new paradigm.  As a minimum, organizations could 
have used this external change to springboard into better financial training and oversight 
before the problem impacted readiness.  The point is that dealing with threats takes 
precious resources away from more productive uses and can take its toll on the unit.  For 
this reason, skilled leadership selectively minimizes the number of threat relationships the 
squadron chooses to face.   
Once it is determined an external factor is a true threat, it is a commander’s 
responsibility to protect the organization from harm.  While there is a potential for greater 
strength in an organization as opposed to an individual, rigid organizational structures 
leave a chink in the armor at every leadership junction.  When a commander possesses 
the authority and resources to protect their squadron there is generally not a problem.  
However, when treatment of an external influencer requires more authority or resources 
than a commander possesses, then skillful advocacy upward to the next higher level of 
organization can be a viable intervention.  Failing to do so makes the commander 
culpable to the harm the squadron feels from the impact of the external threat.  This can 
be a subtle weak spot for the organization.  If a commander perceives his/her role as 
being an autonomous decision maker, s/he may struggle voicing up the chain concerning 
the squadron’s need for assistance.  The problem is worsened if the perception throughout 
the chain of command is that strong leaders solve their own problems while incompetent 
leaders ask for assistance. Under these conditions, short command tour lengths and a 
desire for future promotion can result in some commanders allowing the organization to 
remain at risk rather than speaking upward for help.  As a systems thinker, a commander 
would fight these incentives and get help for the unit before the consequences of inaction 
hurt the squadron. 
A larger category of external influencers can be termed stakeholders, i.e., any 
individual or group that has a stake in the outcomes the organization produces.    For 
example, an airman’s family is an external stakeholder to the squadron the Airmen works 
in.  While an Airmen’s spouse and children do not go to work with him/her every day, 
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they have a strong interest in what occurs at the squadron.  In fact, many such 
stakeholders exist as the example in Figure 2 below illustrates. 
 
Figure 2.   Sample Squadron Stakeholder Relationships  
 
This is not an exhaustive list, but illustrates that as an open system the squadron 
interacts with many outside groups.  Whether recognized or not, this web of relationships 
can be vital to the unit, and strategies for managing them can be essential.  There are 
alternative methods for attempting to manage an array of relationships.  One method 
exercises the process of managing some stakeholders similar to the concept of managing 
internal affairs.  Relationships with “mixed blessing” stakeholders (potentially supportive 
on an issue or potentially threatening on an issue) may need the extra time and resources 
needed to collaborate towards developing win-win relationships.  Finally, defensive 
strategies may be needed to counter non-supportive stakeholders.  
Under the first method, the squadron recognizes the interrelationship with the 
stakeholder and seeks to minimize or maximize the results of the relationship as 
necessary to best suit the organizations objectives.  Each stakeholder is analyzed to 
determine its interests, the incentives driving their actions, and the relative bargaining 
power they hold over the organization to achieve their objectives.  Greater cooperation is 
required with stakeholders who have higher bargaining power, while lesser stakeholders 














organization and its stakeholders can become self serving and focused on power and 
control, i.e., your organization being a stakeholder on their stakeholder map.  The 
organization may choose a strategy of manipulating a weaker stakeholder while 
simultaneously countering manipulation by a more powerful stakeholder.  The level of 
trust in these relationships is likely a moving target, depending on the issue and the 
sensitivities associated with power struggles.  Even when interests overlap, strong 
negotiation skills and tight contractual agreements may be necessary to facilitate 
interaction between the organization and its stakeholders.24 
While these previous scenarios describe reality for many organizational-
stakeholder relationships in the modern world, another view is developing that is more 
aligned with a systems framework for the organization.  While the default may be for 
stakeholders to compete with one another, this dominate or be dominated relationship 
creates incentives to minimize collaboration and withhold information to gain the upper-
hand.  Contrary to this, when organizational leaders seek to find common understanding 
among stakeholders and to build trusting relationships, both parties can benefit by 
describing problems as mutual, i.e., stakeholders collaborate instead of compete to solve 
complex problems thereby seeking alignment with key system influencers. 
The basic premise is to form relationships with stakeholders similar to those 
found in positive human relationships where possible.  This requires a mutual 
understanding of both side’s interests and goals while maintaining a respect for 
differences.  It ultimately requires a level of trust be built between an organization and its 
stakeholders allowing better strategic alignment of all interactions.  From a systems 
standpoint this makes tremendous sense as the organization can never be viewed as 
independent from the environment within which it operates.  Rather than seeing 
stakeholder relationships as a drain on resources, they can be viewed as opportunities to 
create an even stronger position than currently exists. 25 
                                                 
24  Peter Coughlin, Strategy Making, June, 2007.  
25  Ann Svendsen, The Stakeholder Strategy (San Francisco: Berrett-Khoeler Publishers, Inc, 1998).  
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For example, suppose you are a maintenance squadron commander responsible 
for the personnel and maintenance of F-15 aircraft.  Your mission is to provide combat 
capable aircraft to support the Wing’s air superiority mission.  Examining your key 
stakeholders, you highlight the relationship with the three F-15 fighter squadrons’ your 
unit provides aircraft to support.  Because operations and maintenance report through two 
separate chains of command, neither you nor the fighter commanders have direct 
influence over the other unit. 
If the fighter squadrons are approached from the management perspective, it 
becomes clear that you must identify the relative balance of power and seek to minimize 
the fighter squadron’s negative impacts on your unit.  From what you have observed of 
the flying squadrons, they are constantly pushing to fly more sorties.  Not only that, they 
continuously want to make what appear to be ad hoc, last-minute changes to your 
schedule.  Because you must manage the flow of aircraft for daily operations and long-
term maintenance and upgrades, these changes have a substantial rippling effect.  In fact, 
your unit performance ratings are directly tied to measures of scheduling effectiveness 
that punish changes and deviations from the plan.  As a result, you determine to put 
procedures in place that intentionally underutilize the assets as to maintain a buffer for 
when the fighter squadrons require changes.  Likewise, you recognize your bargaining 
power is strongest through monthly “contracts” with the stakeholder.  In this manner, you 
can reduce the amount of changes to your schedule by requiring increased bureaucratic 
oversight to approve even minor schedule changes.  You do not know the fighter 
squadron commanders very well and have limited need to interact with them, relying on 
the formal structures to facilitate the relationships. 
If instead a more collaborative approach between the units is exercised, the 
scenario changes.  First, recognizing that excessive flying and last minute changes are 
impacting your squadron’s effectiveness, you contact the fighter squadron commander to 
try to understand why this is happening.  He explains that the mission requires providing 
combat capable pilots to the Wing and the right mix and quality of training is essential to 
make this happen.  While s/he does care about the number of sorties the unit flies, what is 
more important is that each mission accomplishes the training objective planned.  When 
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this does not occur, the sortie has to be re-accomplished.  While you are graded on 
aircraft effectiveness, s/he is graded on pilot readiness thereby routinely asking for more 
sorties than are needed to ensure there are enough to meet the minimums when fallout 
occurs.  While you build a monthly schedule, s/he builds a weekly schedule. Even then, 
daily schedule changes are often required based on the outcome of each day’s missions.  
You also learn that during certain weeks, the complexity of the flying missions requires 
coordination with many other flying units and hundreds of thousands of dollars are sunk 
into the effort.  During these times, scheduling flexibility is much more important than 
during routine, squadron training. 
After meeting, you both recognize that your objectives are much more intertwined 
than at first look.  With renewed understanding of the others issues and challenges, the 
two squadrons set out to operate from a position of trust and collaboration.  Rather than 
inflate training requests, the flying commander agrees to tell you exactly how many 
sorties are needed to accomplish the mission.  In turn, you agree to not withhold aircraft 
and provide as many sorties as you can, given the condition of your assets.  Each of you 
agree to provide the other with more fidelity of information, highlighting critical periods 
for your units in advance, and attempting to prevent them from overlapping.  Over time, 
trust is developed, and when changes are requested from either unit, they are respected.  
The monthly contract is still maintained, but the amount of bureaucratic oversight is 
minimized and managed. 
This simplified analogy illustrates several principles.  First, when we attempt to 
manage stakeholders we make an assumption that we fully understand their organization 
like we do our own.    Unfortunately, with low trust levels, it is unlikely we have enough 
information to see all the factors at play in the relationship.  Second, managing 
relationships in this manner often leads to a sub-optimal outcome.  Both units were still 
accomplishing the mission, but they were having to work harder to do it and were likely 
less effective.  Collaborating with stakeholders has the potential to improve 
organizational effectiveness and give the squadron earlier and more accurate insight into 
changes in the environment that may impact operations.  Last, collaborative stakeholder 
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relationships take time to develop and have to be maintained.26 While forging strong 
trusting relationships is beneficial to the squadron, it cannot be accomplished overnight 
or without meaningful commitment.  Unfortunately, frequent squadron personnel 
turnover jeopardizes these commitments.  It only takes one commander or key individual 
to revert to manipulative management strategies to destroy a collaborative stakeholder 
relationship that may have taken years to develop. 
In practice, squadron commanders may need to use a combination of these ideas 
to best deal with the external environment.  Unlike the operations-maintenance example 
above, some stakeholder relationships may be beyond the commander’s scope of 
authority to change.  In these cases, more of the management approach will be required 
than in scenarios where the commander has the ability to help shape the relationship.  
From the systems perspective, the goal should be to recognize the power of collaborative 
relationships and attempt to forge them whenever possible. 
D. SUMMARY 
As technology increasingly breaks down the boundaries of information flow, 
organizations must recognize how the external environment relates to the organization.  
Commanders can improve their squadron’s ability to handle these relationships by 
training units to build their situational awareness skills and become organizational 
sensors.  In this manner, Airmen help the unit stay in tune with the changing environment 
so that it can anticipate needed organizational adjustments.  As this information is taken 
in, commanders can filter it through a systems framework to attempt to see what changes 
may impact the squadron.  Classifying these external influencers as threats or 
stakeholders is one method to better understand how to deal most effectively with them.  
Lastly, these relationships can be managed in a traditional manner attempting to 
minimize the negative impacts of stakeholders, or in a more collaborative way that seeks 
win-win agreements through trusting relationships.  Ultimately, a commander will have 
to decide how best to interact with stakeholders, realizing that applying a collaborative 
                                                 
26  Ann Svendsen, The Stakeholder Strategy (San Francisco: Berrett-Khoeler Publishers, Inc, 1998). 
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approach to relationships is desirable, particularly when the issue is important to both 
sides.  When a threat or stakeholder relationship reaches a point a commander is unable 
to effectively interact, s/he would exercise the skill of voicing the need for assistance up 
the chain of command.  Applying these tools, dealing with the external environment can 
become one of the most critical and rewarding aspects of squadron command. 
Armed with a solid theoretical understanding of the systems approach to viewing 
the squadron and its environment, the following two chapters use this framework to 
address current issues facing the Air Force and its squadron commanders.  The following 
chapter will challenge the reader to apply these principles in the area of financial 
leadership. 
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IV. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP 
In today’s military, strong leadership is desperately needed in the command of the 
Air Forces scarce financial resources.  With a 2008 Presidential budget request of 623 
billion dollars, defense spending represents the largest segment of the United States 
discretionary spending.  Strained by six years of active military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, rising personnel costs, and a need to replace aging equipment, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is thirsty for an increasing share of the Nation’s budget.  
As the lowest level of the Air Force organizational structure with command 
authority, most squadron commanders feel far removed from the monstrous defense 
budgeting process and the bureaucracy within which it operates.  In truth, no one within 
the organization has more power to wrangle out inefficiencies and improve defense 
spending than the squadron commander.  As the final step from appropriation to 
obligation, field organizations have the ultimate insight into how dollars are actually 
spent.  Unfortunately, as the DoD has grown, the appropriations process has created 
skewed incentives that often discourage wise spending and can result in resources being 
spent when they should have otherwise been saved.  Examining this problem using an 
organizational systems framework model will help illustrate how this trend must be 
reversed before the organization is hurt by shortsighted thinking.  Before building the 
model, this paper will examine the current state of the federal and defense budgets and 
analyze the forecasted trends to gain insight into the financial environment the Air Force 
is facing.  A systems model for unit defense spending will then be introduced to analyze 
the problem and make recommendations for Air Force squadron commanders. 
A. STATE OF THE NATION’S BUDGET 
A fundamental responsibility of leadership is to interpret the external environment 
and apply that knowledge to the benefit of the organization.  Before addressing squadron 
spending, a basic understanding of the key financial issues facing the nation is necessary.  
Regardless of political affiliation, all citizens should be aware of the growing national 
debt, the solvency of mandatory spending programs, and the impact on future 
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governmental spending.  More so, while political expediency often keeps these long-term 
issues out of the national limelight, commanders must acknowledge and anticipate how 
these issues will impact the DoD’s ability to accomplish its mission.   
At the time of this writing, the total national public debt was over 8.8 Trillion 
dollars.  This includes both private debt (about 3.3 trillion) and federal debt, or the 
amount the government owes to itself.  To gain perspective, in order to retire this debt 
today, every citizen would have to contribute $30,000 beyond their current tax 
obligations.  More alarming, since 2006 this debt has been increasing by 1.3 billion 
dollars a day.27  Figure 3 below illustrates the rise of the national debt adjusted for 




Figure 3.   National Debt Trend From27 
These numbers do not necessarily spell economic disaster, but do illustrate a 
claim on future dollars for which the DoD will compete. 
Adding to mandatory spending are the entitlement programs of Social Security 
and Medicare.  Each of these programs is facing potential long-term insolvency as the 
                                                 
27  "U.S. National Debt Clock," www.brillig.com/debt_clock. (accessed 5/28/2007).  
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nation’s demographics change.  Beginning in 2008, the first of 77 million baby boomers 
will be eligible for Social Security, and the nation’s workforce will begin to drawdown 
faster than it is replenished as this generation retires.28  Under current legislation, the 
decreasing workforce, increasing longevity, and rising health care costs will continue to 
eat up a greater share of our national budget. 
As an example, Social Security expenditures are growing faster than revenues as 
subsequent generations of current workers are not as large as the boomer generation. 
Social Security currently makes up around 4.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is 
expected to increase to 6.7% by 2017.  Additionally, there are currently three workers 
paying into the system for every one receiving benefits.  As the Nation’s demographics 
change, this will shift to only two workers per recipient.  The Congressional Budget 
Office forecasts revenues in the trust accounts to exceed expenditures beginning in the 
year 2017, and being completely drained by 2040. At this point, the pay-as-you-go 
system will only be providing around 74 cents for every dollar of benefits.  The 
remainder will have to be financed from the general funds. 29    
Even worse, Medicare expenditures began exceeding revenues in 2006 with the 
hospital insurance trust fund forecast to be exhausted by 2018.    For the first time in its 
history, Medicare issued a funding warning to inform the executive and legislative 
branches that over 45% of program funding will be coming from non-dedicated 
sources.30  If not corrected, these overages must be paid from the shrinking discretionary 
dollars that also fund defense.  Consider the following quotes from the Social Security 
administration, Medicare trustees, and Congressional Budget Office: 
 
As Social Security and HI reserves are drawn down and SMI general 
revenue financing requirements continue to grow, pressure on the Federal 
 
                                                 
28  Congressional Budget Office, Social Security: A Primer,[September, 2006]) (accessed 6/2006).  
29 Congressional Budget Office, Social Security: A Primer,[September, 2006]) (accessed 6/2006). 
30  Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees, Status of the Social Security and Medicare 
Programs: A Summary of the 2007 Annual Reports,[2007]). 
 34
budget will intensify. We do not believe the currently projected long-run 
growth rates of Social Security or Medicare are sustainable under current 
financing arrangement.31 
 
We are increasingly concerned about inaction on the financial challenges 
facing the Social Security and Medicare programs. The longer we wait to 
address these challenges, the more limited will be the options available, 
the greater will be the required adjustments, and the more severe the 
potential detrimental economic impact on our nation.32 
 
Either a substantial reduction in the growth of spending, a significant 
increase in tax revenues relative to the size of the economy, or some 
combination of spending and revenue changes will be necessary to 
promote the nation's long-term fiscal stability.33 
 
Figure 4 shows graphically this rising budgetary pressure as the entitlement 
programs begin to require an increasing share of the GDP. 
 
 
                                                 
31  Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees, Status of the Social Security and Medicare 
Programs: A Summary of the 2007 Annual Reports,[2007]). 
32  Ibid. 
33  Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 
2017,[January, 2007]).  
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Figure 4.   Spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid as a Percentage of GDP 
1996 to 2016 From34 
 
Over this same period, the rate of GDP growth is forecast to be about half as 
much as these mandatory spending items.  Overall, mandatory spending currently 
consumes over 60 percent of the federal budget with the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) forecasting continued growth over the next decade.35 
For DoD leaders scanning the external environment, these numbers should 
provide insight into the landscape defense spending is placed.  While we can be assured 
the projections are not completely accurate, commanders should concentrate on the 
projected trends and attempt to forecast the impact on the DoD as a whole and 
specifically on the units they lead. 
                                                 
34  Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update,[August, 2006]).    
35  Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2017  
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B. DEFENSE TRENDS AND FUNDING 
While most Air Force commanders have had exposure to the defense 
appropriations process few would claim mastery of this complex system.  Ultimately, to 
resource the military, countless man hours and systems must interact before any money is 
available for readiness.  As this figure from the Naval War College illustrates, no one 
agency has complete control over the budgeting process with individual Service’s 




Figure 5.   Planning & Budgeting Relationships From36 
 
While most squadron commanders have limited impact on PPBE, an appreciation 
for its complexity is valuable.  This complexity makes detailed performance monitoring 
and system flexibility very difficult.  Likewise, giant bureaucracies have been created 
resulting in strong levels of entrenchment within the various sub-agencies.  
                                                 
36 Adopted from Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for Defense Financial Manager's., 
ed. Phillip Candreva (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2006).  p 28. 
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As the product of this process, the annual Defense Appropriations Act represents 
the largest category of discretionary spending in the federal budget.  Unlike mandatory 
spending, the DoD budget is revisited each year and is therefore more sensitive to the 
politics of the day than mandatory spending.  In real dollar terms, the budget has 
fluctuated both up and down by several hundred billion dollars over the past fifty years.  
As a percentage of GDP however, it has remained reasonably constant as Figure 6 
illustrates. 
 
    Source: Congressional Budget Office 
 
Figure 6.   Defense Spending as percentage of GDP From37 
 
This chart is often cited as evidence the Nation is under spending on defense 
during a period of a protracted war on terror. As seen above, most recent conflicts 
exhibited large spikes in defense spending.  While this may be true, other environmental 
changes may also account for the differences.  Notably, the relationship between 
mandatory spending and discretionary spending has also changed during this same 
period.  In 1960 mandatory spending accounted for 32% of the federal budget.  By 2004, 
it had more than doubled to 68% leaving only 32% available for defense and all other  
 
                                                 
37  Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for Defense Financial Manager's., ed. Phillip 
Candreva (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2006). 
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discretionary programs.38  This change in the available financial resources has impacted 
the country’s war time surge ability and has increased the pressure to reduce DoD 
spending as soon as feasible. 
In addition to the financial pressures, the struggle for control of the DoD between 
the Congressional and Executive branches also impacts our approach to the problem.  As 
we begin to develop a systems mindset to the financial problems facing the Services, it is 
important to note Congress, not the President, has the Constitutional responsibility for 
providing for the Nation’s defense.  Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution states that 
Congress has responsibility: 
To raise and support Armies; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To 
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them 
as may be employed in the Service of the United States… 
This point must be understood as Congress ultimately exerts significant leverage 
on the financial conduct of Air Force squadrons.   
Equally as complex as the DoD budgetary system, is the flow of funds from 
Congress down to the Services.  Layered in law, regulations, and accepted practice, DoD 
eventually receives budget authority (permission to obligate the government), and passes 
it down through the chain to end users as illustrated below in Figure 7.  
 
                                                 
38  Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for Defense Financial Manager's., ed. Phillip 
Candreva (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2006). 
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    Source: Defense Financial Handbook 
 
Figure 7.   Flow of Funds From39 
 
As the authority is passed down, a line is drawn below which commanders are not 
responsible for anti-deficiency violations.  Below this line, commanders are not held 
legally responsible for ensuring funds are not overspent.  Most squadron commanders fall 
into this category and are given operational targets or budget allowances from the wing or 
major command level.  Spending within these target levels becomes the objective 
squadron commanders are expected to achieve. 
Unfortunately, the financial management control system of such a giant 
bureaucracy creates skewed incentives for unit commanders.  While tight legislation, 
regulations and controls require all transactions to pass the tests of purpose, time, and 
amount this does not ensure efficiency.  Anyone who has witnessed end-of-year spending 
realizes monies are often spent that would not have otherwise been used were it not for 
the expiration of the funds.   Adages such as “if you don’t spend it you can’t get more” 
and “whoever spends the most gets the most” have just enough truth in them to further 
illustrate this principal.  While collectively all can agree spending should not occur in this 
                                                 
39  Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for Defense Financial Manager's., ed. Phillip 
Candreva (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2006). 
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manner, there are few punishments for the spendthrifts in our organizations.  As we will 
see in the next section, this short-term thinking will hurt our squadrons if we do not 
become agents for change. 
C. SYSTEMS MODEL FOR UNIT SPENDING 
Both the external and internal environments described above create a financial 
context from which unit commanders should approach their fiduciary responsibilities.  As 
has been shown, the complexity of the systems involved make large sweeping changes 
very difficult to enact.  The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have attempted 
to reap savings through improved business process models.  The Air Force Smart 
Operations 21 is a leadership initiative aimed at more efficient resource use through 
system-wide process improvement.  For many reasons, business initiatives have met with 
tough resistance throughout the service ranks.  In large part, bureaucratic entrenchment 
and the structure of the management control system itself foster this resistance.  In order 
to achieve any success with these efforts, commanders must see the situation from a 
different mindset.  
Using a systems thinking framework we can develop the feedback loop shown 
below in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Systems Construct For Spending After40 
                                                 
40 For a complete discussion of systems thinking and the development of systems models for 
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The left hand side illustrates the relationship within the DOD of requesting, 
appropriating, and spending funds to obtain some measure of unit readiness.  As we 
know, defining the actual level of readiness is very difficult to do.  Many operational 
commanders feel their units are never ready enough, and therefore there are never enough 
funds to get to their desired level.  This can result in ever-increasing budget requests.  
Given the magnitude and uncertainties of operational taskings, this mindset in itself is not 
unreasonable under the current framework. Added to this, there is a strong perception that 
if money is not spent, it will be taken away in a subsequent year and threaten future 
readiness.  The result is most unit commanders are prone to spend all the money they are 
allowed even if they do not feel it really necessary in the current period.  The incentive to 
spend all you are given runs contrary to efficient spending where resources are spent to 
achieve their maximum effectiveness.  By prioritizing and rewarding units for fully 
expending resources, we have aimed our focus at measuring spending, not readiness. 
The right hand side of the diagram is a balancing loop and incorporates some of 
the external stakeholders discussed in previous sections.  The Congress exerts its 
constitutional authority over the DoD through the appropriation and authorization 
process.  This activity generates an appropriations bill that is reported to the general 
public.  The size of the defense bill impacts the general public as it limits discretionary 
spending for all the other programs important to the many constituents of Congress.  
While recognizing the majority of the general public truly appreciates the safety and 
security provided by a strong military, we must also realize how other concerns factor 
into public perception.  Education, healthcare, welfare programs, and job security are a 
few of the many issues that add to the frame of reference the public will view the defense 
spending bill.  Any public perception of waste within the DoD will also reduce the 
perceived value.  Ultimately, after some delay for the democratic process, the majority 
public opinion will work its way back through our democracy to more congressional 
action.   
It is known that the further removed consequences are from the source of the 
actions which triggered them; the more difficult it becomes to see causal relationships.  
When we fail to understand root causes of problems, we are unlikely to make any 
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significant long-term improvements.41 Starting at the lower levels of the Air Force, if 
squadron spending is inefficient and collectively results in higher budget requests and 
higher appropriations in the short run, it may take several years of growing negative 
public opinion before we see a decrease in defense appropriation.  We are then likely to 
assume the decreases are more arbitrary and political than they really are and will fail to 
appreciate our contribution to the problem. 
Herein lays the danger for the Air Force when squadrons view themselves as 
isolated from the larger process and more victims of budget cuts than contributors. A 
vicious cycle of rising and falling budgets is likely and certainly will jeopardize the long-
term readiness of the force.  As an example, the Air Force is currently operating the 
oldest fleet in history and recapitalization is an absolute must.  Unless something 
changes, this means the organization needs large increases in budget authority to make 
these investments and ensure future readiness.  From our Service leader’s perspective, the 
right hand side of the diagram must be generating a favorable response for this to occur.  
Since the Secretary and Chief of Staff have no direct control over the right-hand diagram, 
they must find the highest point of leverage on the left side of the loop.  In addition to re-
addressing what readiness means, targeting the spending side by ensuring the Service is 
operating as efficiently as possible is the clear choice.  Reducing spending through 
gaining process efficiencies is the highest leverage point within the Service’s control.  
Clearly, this is recognition by the Air Force has helped bring about the AFSO 21 
initiative.  
Remembering the skewed incentives and organizational complexity of the 
budgeting and flow of funds processes, the structures are not well aligned to accomplish 
these changes, and so they are met with resistance.  For the squadron commander, it is 
difficult to see the link, much less the incentive, between saving money by not buying 
more chairs during end-of-year spending and recapitalization of the fleet.  Admittedly, 
this is a major problem as saving money is not at the root of the problem and can only 
have limited effectiveness until higher leverage points are addressed.  Changing our 
                                                 
41  Senge, The Fifth Discipline..  
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views on issues such as readiness measurement, appropriations accounting, and resource 
management will require the underlying Congressional structure for funding the DoD to 
also change.  In fact, ideas such as performance-based budgeting (PBB) have gained 
increasing momentum over the past decade in the public sector and may someday impact 
these issues.42 Effects-based operations (EBO) are a similar form of this thinking and are 
being implemented across many Air Force disciplines.  EBO, which focuses on 
determining a desired measurable outcome then acting (resourcing) and reporting to that 
level, is a major step in the right direction for gaining leverage in the system model.  
The problem remains that given the long delays associated with both military and 
public policy changes, squadron commanders cannot wait until all the structures have 
been adjusted before beginning to change the spending paradigms.  The consequences of 
waiting are continuing the vicious cycle illustrated, until ultimately the balancing loop 
makes an overcorrection and true readiness levels are hurt.  Many current commanders 
will be retired from service by then, and these changes will not trace directly back to 
today’s actions.  We all, however, will continue to be part of the general public desiring 
from our military continued safety to enjoy peace and prosperity.  It is for these reasons, 
we must act now at the unit level to improve resource efficiency and cooperate with 
AFSO 21 initiatives. 
Practically, good stewardship and citizenry are not always rewarded under the 
current system.  It is paramount that squadron commanders take the initiative to achieve 
efficiencies and generate savings.  These savings must then be passed back up the chain 
for efficient re-allocation. Commanders must speak upward informing the next level how 
efficiencies were created and how much better the squadron could do if certain structures 
were changed.  These commanders must then follow suit until ultimately higher leverage 
solutions are proposed to Congress and the true barriers to efficiency are removed. 
                                                 
42  Matthew Andrews, "Authority, Acceptance, Ability and Performance -Based Budgeting Reforms," 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 17, no. 4 (2004), 332-344.  
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has developed a framework for squadron commanders to better 
understand the difficult financial situation the Air Force is currently facing and become 
agents for change by finding and passing on savings through more efficient operations.  
Given the impending pressures facing the federal budget, public opinion is not likely to 
favor an upward trending defense budget.  Examining the systems diagram presented 
here and recognizing the impact of delays on the balancing loop, it is clear that future 
readiness can best be ensured through action today.  It will not be the resource advisors or 
budgeteers who must lead this action but the unit commanders in the multitude of 
organizations across the Air Force.  Collectively, squadron commanders have the greatest 
ability to overcome organizational inertia and generate upward momentum for change 
and they must pursue these ends.  Our dual role as both Airmen and citizens demands that 
we take on this challenge for the sake of the Air Force and the Nation. 
Generating these changes requires a commitment to becoming more efficient with 
the scarce resources the Nation entrusts to our squadrons.  This can only be done, when 
an organization fully understands the processes occurring within the unit.  The final 
chapter will provide an overview of process thinking and the Air Force Smart Operations 
for the 21st century framework that aims to develop a culture of continuous process 
improvement. 
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V. AIR FORCE SMART OPERATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY  
Perhaps more than any of the services, the Air Force has a history of adoption of 
civilian leadership and business practices.  From transformational leadership to total 
quality management, the service has never been reluctant to introduce and adapt current 
civilian initiatives into the Air Force’s way of doing business.43 Since, as a service, we 
espouse flexibility as the key to airpower, we should not be surprised that this willingness 
to change flows over into our organizational concepts.  While sometimes challenging, 
this willing and pioneering spirit is part of our culture and has contributed to the 
Service’s success.   
Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO 21) is the newest 
initiative the Air Force has undertaken to meet today’s challenges.  It is a compilation of 
many tools aimed at improving the organization.  While all of the concepts have been 
developed in the academic and business communities, AFSO 21 has as one of its chief 
objectives for Airmen to internalize the program and make it a part of Air Force culture.  
AFSO 21 can be best described as a framework for continuous process improvement 
throughout all levels of the organization and across the full range of Air Force 
operations.44 
Lest we approach AFSO 21 from a purely business perspective, consider what has 
occurred over the battle-space in the last five years.  Time-sensitive targeting (TST) is the 
process by which a commander can employ airpower against an emerging target with a 
very short window of opportunity.  As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
highlighted, the strategic importance of these targets can be immense.  Unfortunately, the 
initial design of the process resulted in response times measured in days.  Through a 
process study and mapping of the value adding steps of the TST process, Air Force 
airpower is now able to deliver precision ordnance in a matter of minutes instead of days.  
                                                 
43  Mike Thirtle, "Toward Defining Air Force Leadership" In Air War College Senior Leader Course, 
Book 1 ed. (Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2006), 23.  
44  Air Force Smart Operations for the 21St Century Playbook AFSO 21 Office,[Nov, 2006]).  
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The principles that resulted in this marked improvement in combat capability are all 
embedded in the AFSO 21 framework.  As such, the shift in mindset AFSO 21 can help 
create has the ability to become an enabling force for knowledgeable Airman both over 
the battle space and in the supporting squadrons that make up the Air Force. 
While it is easy for senior leaders to mandate this initiative, it is much more 
difficult for them to dictate the conceptual acceptance needed for true gains.  In order to 
unleash the real power of the AFSO 21 concepts, Airmen working in the thousands of Air 
Force squadrons must see for themselves the impact the program can have on daily 
operations.  This will only occur if squadron commanders can digest the principles of 
AFSO 21 and lead their squadrons toward improvement.  While initiated at the 
Headquarters level of the Air Force organization, only in these squadron-level, bottom-up 
changes will AFSO 21 reach the potential our Service leaders envision.  The aim of this 
chapter is to demystify the process concepts embedded in AFSO 21 and provide squadron 
commanders with a baseline understanding of process improvement they can apply to 
their specific organization’s mission. To that end, the paper will develop the groundwork 
for AFSO 21 by illustrating its place within a systems view of the Air Force.  An 
overview of the civilian process improvement roots will then be presented along with the 
AFSO 21 plan of adaptation.   Finally, specific aspects of the AFSO 21 plan will be 
illustrated with suggestions for squadron commander implementation. 
A. WHY AFSO 21? 
Before going further, it is important to make the link between AFSO 21 (process 
improvement) and the systems framework the previous chapters have developed.  
Fortunately, systems thinking and process improvement go hand in hand.  Systems 
thinking creates a framework to view the organization and its surroundings holistically, 
enabling better insight into the interconnectedness of each part of the system.  As we 
have seen, applying systems thinking towards leading an organization can help expand 
understanding of the unit and deepen the ability to see systemic problems.  Process 
thinking seeks to accomplish a similar goal by looking at the internal end-to-end 
processes within an organization, as opposed to just the functions that support them. 
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Recall from Chapter II, the organizational systems model shown again in Figure 9 
below.  When the organization takes in inputs, it goes through a transformation process of 
those inputs to increase their value in the form of visible results.    While there are many 
ways to go about this transformation, an organization will be most productive when each 
aspect of the system is connected in an aligned and meaningful manner (congruence).  
Organizations with high levels of congruence experience a form of competitive 
advantage that is difficult for others to imitate.45  The aim of AFSO 21 is to do just that 
by creating an organizational culture that can more clearly reflect the underlying 
processes at work in the organization and continuously improve them to build a more 
congruent Air Force system. 
 
Figure 9.   Organizational Systems Model From46 
Those who have been around the Air Force for any length of time may 
immediately associate AFSO 21 with the total quality management (TQM) initiative and 
run for the hills.  This would be a mistake.  This chapter is presented last in the series 
because AFSO 21 must be received in the right frame of mind.  To a systems thinker, 
                                                 
45  Nadler and Tushman, A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior, 35-51  
46 The author has drawn on several sources for the development of the organizational model.  Work 
from Nadler and Tushman, A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior, 35-51, Harold Leavitt, 
William Dill and Henry Eyring, The Organizational World (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovancih, Inc., 
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process improvement in an organization is not optional but a natural consequence of 
seeking higher levels of congruence.        
Conceptually, process stagnation in the face of a changing environment will 
eventually mean death or irrelevance for the system; therefore, continuous process 
improvement is vital.47  Unfortunately, a lack of understanding often causes the tools of 
improvement to be emphasized rather than the principles that the tools were created to 
support.  When this occurs, more work is often created than value is generated.  For 
instance, for many unfortunate Airmen, TQM became nothing more than bleary hours of 
generating metrics to build slides few understood, much less used to make improvements.   
This problem is not limited to the Air Force.  In civilian manufacturing, Toyota 
has long been recognized as the leader in continuous process improvement.  Surprisingly, 
Toyota has freely shared its practices and opened its doors to observation by hundreds of 
thousands of executives worldwide.  Despite this, few companies have been able to 
generate similar successes even after implementing the exact same tools Toyota uses.  
After four years of study on this problem, Harvard scholars concluded the reason for this 
failure was “the observers confused the tools and practices they saw on their plant visits 
with the system itself.” 48 As a systems thinker and squadron leader, one must not get 
caught in this trap.  The reason for AFSO 21 is not to get better at using process tools, but 
to enable the organization to improve. 
As we saw in the last chapter, external financial pressures at the National level are 
resulting in ever-increasing fiscal pressures for the Department of Defense.  In order to 
adapt to this changing environment, the organization must change to continue to meet the 
Nation’s Defense needs.  Likewise, internal pressures to improve are also being generated 
from an increasingly knowledgeable and professional Airmen corps desiring both better 
work environments and results.  In truth, throughout its history, this dedicated Airmen 
cadre has always set out to improve the Air Force.  After all, service members are some 
                                                 
47  Richard T. Pascale, "Surfing the Edge of Chaos," MIT Sloan Management Review 40, no. 3 
(Spring, 1999), 83-94 (accessed 8/30/2007).  
48  Steven Spear and H. Kent Bowen, "Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System," Harvard 
Business Review 77, no. 5 (1999/09//Sep/Oct99, , 96-106 (accessed 8/30/2007).  
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of the most dedicated and conscientious individuals our Nation has to offer.  Yet, while 
Airmen work hard to improve their units, this does not always mean they are improving 
the system.  Regardless of how diligent the workforce, the impact of localized 
improvement efforts can be limited by the existing structures within the system, unless 
they are overcome by a unified effort across the whole organization. If successful, AFSO 
21 can provide the voice and avenue for this unified effort and result in the improvements 
all Airmen desire.   
Why AFSO 21?  Because as system thinkers, we know a complex, adaptive 
system like the Air Force must continuously change for survival.  Not only that, but in an 
organization that spans the globe and employs more than 350,000 people, a framework 
for this change must be put in place to capture organizational learning and guide the 
thousands of sub-systems (squadrons) that make up our Air Force.  With this in mind, let 
us begin to examine the roots of process improvement found in the AFSO 21 initiative. 
B. PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
Through either professional military education (PME) or personal study, most 
commanders have been exposed to at least some of the different process improvement 
programs used in AFSO 21. Lean, Six Sigma, and Theory of Constraints are but a few 
familiar programs that could be included in the process improvement movement.  
Without addressing these specifically, it is helpful to understand the origins of these 
programs to better understand why they can add value to dynamic organizations. 
Process improvement has been an ongoing pursuit to better organize the way 
people accomplish their work.  At the core, its chief aims are to more efficiently use the 
resources that go into producing the outputs of an organization.  The advancements in the 
concepts are easiest to trace in the improvements in the manufacturing sector.  From the 
introduction of interchangeable parts in the 1850s, Henry Ford’s assembly lines of the 
1930s and the Toyota Production System of the late 1900s, manufacturing processes have 
been on a continual quest for better ways to accomplish work.49  Overlaid on these 
                                                 
49  "Lean Manufacturing History," http://www.strategosinc.com/just_in_time.htm. (accessed 
8/16/2007).  
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physical improvements, management philosophies have evolved to improve 
organizational effectiveness.  Through standardized work and time studies, Fredrick 
Taylor introduced Scientific Management in the early 1900s to improve labor efficiency.  
Frank Gilbreth added process charts and motion studies while Deming developed total 
quality management (TQM) following WWII.  Japanese guru Taichi Ono developed the 
principles of Just-In-Time and stockless production to support the innovative Toyota 
Production System.50   
Lean thinking was born out of the principles of these various ideas.  A lean 
process is simply one in which only the steps that add value to the final outcome are 
present in the system.  Continuing on this improvement pathway, Six Sigma was initially 
introduced by Motorola in the mid 1980s.  With roots similar to Total Quality 
Management, Six Sigma utilizes statistical tools to improve efficiency by reducing 
variation in work processes.  Around the same time, Eli Goldratt popularized the notion 
of eliminating system constraints with the Theory of Constraints, illustrated in the book, 
The Goal.51 
Even this cursory and incomplete history of process improvement can easily leave 
the best leaders feeling apathetic. Outside of academics, most practicing managers do not 
have the time to master a new management program every few years.  In truth, if one 
took the time to read up on the different programs he/she would find that at their base 
these programs have tremendous similarities with incremental improvements in either 
management philosophy, or management tools.  In an honest quest to improvement 
management science, the eventual branding process of each new idea makes it appear to 
be something entirely new rather than a complement to frameworks.  What Air Force 
leaders can benefit the most from is an understanding of the fundamental principles of 
process improvement, which can be seen throughout all of the philosophies.   
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The baseline of systems thinking is the perfect framework to make these 
connections.  At the core, process improvement strategies teach practitioners to see work 
not as pieced together individual tasks, but as connected processes following a flow that 
often transcends our formal work structures.  While a squadron may be organized around 
activity-based flights, what it produces most likely follows a flow that involves multiple 
activities coming together to accomplish the finished product or mission.  This simple 
holistic shift of mind, should guide a leader to define and optimize the processes of the 
organization rather than the individual activities that make up the process.  There are 
many industry tools with branded names like process mapping or value stream mapping 
to help accomplish this, but the tools are secondary to the principle itself. 
Another unifying theme of process improvement is the continual elimination of 
waste across organization’s system processes. Waste of all kinds does not contribute to 
the accomplishment of the final product and can be a major source of inefficiency in the 
process.  Mentioned earlier, manufactures have gained significant improvements by 
reducing both material and labor wastes.  For instance, small but consistent reductions in 
the amount of scrap sheet metal in a maintenance back-shop can greatly improve 
efficiency when multiplied over time or over the hundreds of back-shops in the Air 
Force.  Likewise, reducing the distance or number of people financial documents must 
traverse before completed, could be a significant waste reduction for a financial services 
squadron.  Once understood, this is a concept a squadron commander can use relatively 
easily without any specific tools.  For illustration purposes, Table 1 shows one 












waste Non-value add is waste Constraints drive waste 
Application 





1. Identify Value  
2. Define Value 
Stream  
3. Determine Flow 
4. Define Pull  
5. Improve Process 
1. Identify Constraint 
2. Exploit Constraint 
3. Subordinate Others 
4. Elevate Constraint 
5. Repeat Cycle  
Tools Math-Statistics Visualization Systems thinking 
Focus Problem focused Process flow focused Constraint focused 
 Source: AFSO 21 Playbook 
Table 1.   Process Improvement Program Summary From52 
So while process improvement may seem a daunting subject requiring more time 
than a commander has to give it, much can be accomplished just by viewing the 
organization holistically and being exposed to some of the basic concepts.  From the 
author’s perspective, AFSO 21 will reach its greatest effectiveness when Airmen of all 
ranks no longer view it as a program, but just as the framework from which to set in 
motion and capture process changes.  As an Air Force we should not undertake AFSO 21 
anymore than we should have “done TQM.”  Rather, we should learn to think 
systematically about our organizations and therefore improve them by re-designing or 
bettering the processes embedded in squadrons worldwide. 
C. THE AFSO 21 APPROACH TO PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
Fortunately, the Air Force has taken just such a holistic approach to enterprise-
wide implementation of process improvement.  AFSO 21 is not advocating an off-the-
shelf improvement solution born out of the most recent academic or business consultant 
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research. Instead, the program is attempting to set a framework within the Air Force for 
Airmen at all levels to improve the Air Force.  Read the following excerpt of the 
commander’s intent for AFSO 21: 
The Commander’s intent is to improve processes across the Air Force to 
eliminate the wastes and costs that do not add value to the Air Force’s core 
mission and tasks. We will apply proven process improvement practices 
and tools, but focused primarily on Lean concepts adapted to our Airman 
culture. Senior Leaders and Commanders will lead this effort and 
participate at all levels of command. We support a fundamental cultural 
change where all Airmen understand their individual role in improving our 
daily processes and contributing to the Air Force mission, and where all 
Senior Leaders and Commanders understand their role in removing 
barriers that inhibit mission effectiveness and process efficiencies. This 
will be accomplished with a sense of urgency and applied top-to-bottom in 
the Air Force.53  
From this, one can see the intent is to make this a distinctly Air Force movement. 
If this is achieved, proven process improvement principles and tools will be adapted (not 
merely adopted) to the Air Force culture.  Fundamental to that goal is for commanders to 
understand these principles so they can empower the vast knowledge base embedded in 
the Airmen whom they lead.  As has been shown, these principles are all based in a 
holistic, system’s view of the organization.  Avenues for training in methods and tools 
will occur, but must be preceded by this fundamental shift of mind in how we view our 
Air Force organization. 
The strategy for AFSO 21 implementation as well as the governance structure can 
be found in the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century Playbook, Version 1.1 
dated November, 2006.  Adopted from this manual, the figure below illustrated the AFSO 
21 undertaking is a long-term endeavor appropriate for systemic improvements.  During a 
typical two year squadron command tour, a commander should expect to see only a small 
portion of the full implementation.  For the change process to take root, progress must be 
passed from one commander to the next each holding a long-term, systemic view of the 
organization.   
                                                 







Mature and Sustain 
 Leadership commitment 
 Share vision 
 Establish governance 
 Mission priorities / goals set 
 Initial training and benchmarking 
 Quick visible wins – 
demonstration area established 
 Structure in place to sustain process 
improvement 
 All key area “touched” 
 Strategic alignment of goals / 
metrics 
 Redeployment of resources is 
routine 
 Substantial and growing 
performance improvements 
 Commanders spending more time 
on strategy and improvements 
 Self-improving work teams 
 Cultural changes effected 
 Improvements extended to strategic 
partners 
 Use more advanced Lean CPI tools 
Years 1 – 3 Years 2 – 5 Years 4 – 7 
Source: AFSO 21 Playbook 
Table 2.   AFSO 21 Implementation Timeline From54 
The timeline shown in Table 2 demonstrates another important concept that may 
be missed if the program is considered to be merely a top-down initiative.  With a four to 
seven year timeline to maturity, today’s staff sergeants and captains will be the squadron 
leadership during Phase Three when AFSO 21 is reaching full implementation.  If the Air 
Force enterprise fails to engage the younger ranks now, this implementation process 
could become a loop instead of a linear timeline.  That is why this current generation of 
squadron commanders is crucial to the long-term success of the process improvement 
initiative.  These younger ranks are in the specialization phase of their careers and will 
not pursue AFSO 21 any more than their predecessors pursued TQM if they are not 
introduced to the concepts at the squadron level.  Enterprise-wide communication 
methods, such as the AFSO 21 Playbook, Air Force Portal, and Letters from the Chief, 
are likely too far removed from these ranks to make a significant impact on their 
thinking.  Leaders they see and hear day-to-day must make these concepts come to life 
within a frame of reference these younger Airmen can relate to.  Finding ways to interject 
systems thinking and process improvement concepts into everyday practices and 
communications will benefit the entire Air Force and help to facilitate the desired cultural 
changes. 
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D. AFSO 21 MODEL 
The AFSO 21 Air Force team has developed a model to illustrate the continuous 
change process desired by the program.  Figure 10 shows the five steps included in this 
iterative improvement model. 
 
Source: AFSO 21 Playbook 
Figure 10.   AFSO21 Five-Step Continuous Improvement Cycle From55 
 
Notice that imbedded within the model is the underlying assumption that the 
improvements initiated will be based on increasing combat capability.  Recall from 
Chapter III, that in setting the direction for the squadron, every Air Force unit should be 
seeking to maximize combat capability.  By unifying process improvement Air Force 
wide, AFSO 21 provides an avenue for the organization to recover saved resources across 
a multitude of units and redeploy them to best meet this maximization goal.  In a perfect 
world, all waste and non-value added activities eliminated from processes across every 
type of Air Force squadron could be captured as an enterprise-wide increase in combat 
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capability.  We know we will never reach perfection, but in the process of trying to reach 
this theoretical maximum, Air Force combat capability will increase.  Likewise, 
organizational systems thinking recognizes cultural change cannot be mandated.  While 
the commander’s intent clearly calls for cultural change and the AFSO 21 model 
highlights its significance, these mandates cannot ensure it will occur.  Cultural change is 
a process within itself and will take time to achieve.   
A great example of successful cultural change is the safety culture that has 
developed throughout the Air Force.  Decades ago, aircraft mishap rates and safety 
related incidents were off the charts by today’s standards.  A change of mindset had to 
occur before a cultural change could develop.  As Airmen began to understand the 
significant impact on combat capability safety incidents caused, the seeds for change 
developed.  Accordingly, safety programs now fall directly under commanders with 
accountability assigned to each commander for ensuring safe operations.  As such, safety 
has become part of our culture and Airmen are accustomed to continued emphasis from 
their supervisors on safe practices and risk management.  For real process improvement 
to occur, a similar ownership of AFSO 21 needs to occur through the entire command 
structure of the Air Force.  Cultural change takes time, but it is nearly impossible if the 
formal and informal leaders of the organization do not embrace the changes. 
E. SQUADRON COMMANDER’S ROLE 
Besides taking ownership for the program and leading change, squadron 
commanders can help initiate process improvement directly during the early stages of the 
continuous improvement model illustrated in Figure 10.  As mentioned, most Air Force 
structures are designed around activities and not processes.  During the second step of the 
five-step model, a commander can lead the squadron in stepping back and defining the 
actual process flows occurring within the organization.  Although difficult, ignoring how 
the squadron is functionally structured and just seeing how the squadron produces its 
products may be all that is required to recognize areas for potential improvement.  While 
there are tools for this (e.g., value stream mapping), a first cut can easily be accomplished 
just by observing and sketching the work process.   
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Within the AFSO 21 governance structure, specific individuals will be trained in 
process improvement (process managers) and will be able to assist a commander and the 
unit as necessary in the use of these tools.  The important point is that regardless of the 
governance AFSO 21 creates, the multitude of processes across the Air Force requires 
that many of the areas for improvement will need to be identified at the squadron level.  
This may lead to bigger projects if the process is ultimately connected to higher levels of 
the enterprise. However, identification of these connected processes by the lowest levels 
of the organization will be an integral part of unraveling complex enterprise processes. 
Likewise, some activities may be identified within the squadron that do not add 
value to the squadron’s mission.  AFSO 21 literature calls these “transactional activities.”  
The processing of Officer Performance Reports (OPRs) is an example of a transactional 
activity.  The recent change from two-sided to one-sided OPR forms is an example of 
reducing the waste in a transactional activity.  While the OPR process is necessary, it 
does not add value and therefore its impact on mission accomplishment should be 
minimized.  While hard to quantify, one can imagine the tremendous number of man-
hours this simple procedural change will create.  On a smaller scale, squadron 
commanders should trace some of the transactional activities occurring daily within the 
unit to look for areas of improvement.  Are reports being generated or briefing slides 
compiled that have no value to the mission?  Find and eliminate these types of activities 
to both accomplish a process improvement action and free up resources for better uses. 
As was the case in the flying and maintenance squadron examples given in 
Chapter III, some of the processes a squadron identifies will cross organizational lines.  
This is where the governance structure developed in Phase One of AFSO 21 timeline 
(Figure 3) will allow improvement.  In the past, processes crossing functional stovepipes 
or organizational lines were difficult to impact due to the multiple levels of ownership for 
the different activities.  Under the AFSO 21 guidance, process owners at the appropriate 
rank structure will be identified when this situation is encountered.  These owners will be 




events across organizational lines.  Therefore, when a squadron commander identifies a 
process of this type, he/she will now have a venue through the chain of command to 
recommend investigation or improvement. 
The last concept for squadron commanders this paper will address involves step 
three, process redesign, shown in Figure 9.  In the early 1990s a concept called Business 
Process Reengineering was introduced by consultant Michael Hammer in the Harvard 
Business Review.  Basically, Hammer observed that as technology was increasing, 
businesses were consistently trying to overlay this technology on top of their existing 
processes.  He advocated that it was “time to stop paving the cow paths,” and Business 
Process Reengineering was born.56   According to Hammer, as complex organizations 
grow, many processes develop that were never intentionally designed but were the 
compilation of the growth process.  The result is that many processes that do not work 
well become entrenched in the organization.  Likewise, over time, organizations develop 
layers of written and unwritten rules that become outdated and limit improvement 
opportunities.  As such, Hammer contends many processes should not be marginally 
changed or optimized, but should be obliterated and completely redesigned to fit the 
organization’s current needs.57  Undoubtedly, a large organization like the Air Force has 
many processes that must fit this description.  These processes are perpetuated within the 
system as new Airmen are inducted into the service because of our strong emphasis on 
training and standardization.  As a commander develops a feel for the processes occurring 
within the unit, he should challenge the assumptions going into the processes themselves 
and determine whether they are in need of a complete redesign with more relevant 
assumptions.   
For example, an enterprise process improvement like the Defense Travel System 
challenged the assumption the military needed fully-staffed travel offices on every base.  
While at one time, airline reservation systems and completion of travel documentation 
required specialized training, advances in technology changed the underlying 
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assumptions the initial process was built upon.  While implementation issues of DTS at 
some locations have hampered its acceptance, it has much more potential to save 
resources and streamline the travel process than minor modifications to the older system 
could have yielded.  Inevitably, outdated processes such as these are occurring on smaller 
scales throughout the Air Force waiting for an observant commander to redesign them for 
the modern world. 
Similarly, it is likely that embedded within the volumes of directives guiding Air 
Force activities are outdated rules that ultimately constrain improvement on the processes 
they impact.  Unfortunately, finding these constraints can be difficult within a highly 
rules-based culture such as the Air Force.  Even the Air Force IDEA (Innovative 
Development through Employee Awareness) program lists recommendations regarding 
changes to existing Air Force policies, rules, procedures, and regulations as ineligible 
suggestions.58  While understandable given that rules are devised to help promote good 
order and discipline, the problem in this structure is that those most likely to recognize 
the rules-based constraints are unlikely to recommend them to be changed.  At the unit 
level, squadron commanders can give younger Airmen an avenue to voice their 
observations regarding work constraining policies and procedures.  While some 
suggestions may come from a lack of a proper perspective, a commander will likely find 
many rules-based constraints that could be removed.  Once identified, the commander 
can recommend changes through the appropriate regulation revision process.  
F. SUMMARY 
While Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century is a new initiative, it is 
clearly based on a proven systems framework for improving dynamic organizations like 
today’s Air Force.  Beneath the layers of governance, implementation, and process tools 
presented in AFSO 21 documents, lie fundamental principles any commander can 
implement to improve the squadron.  These principles take a holistic approach to 
squadron outputs by viewing work as process flows rather than simply connected 
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activities.  Once the branding is peeled away from popular management programs, 
consistent themes can be found that do not require a commander to be a process 
improvement expert in order to begin to improve the organization.  
Most importantly, squadron commanders need to take a systemic view of the Air 
Force in order to lead their Airmen to improve processes in a manner that maximizes 
combat capability.  It would be a tragic loss of opportunity if AFSO 21 were half-
heartedly adopted by squadron commanders, or worse, presented to younger Airmen as 
another flavor of TQM.  Whether in a flying squadron or a contracting squadron, 
continuous process improvement makes sense.  Not only that, but the framework for 
improvement within AFSO 21 is adaptable enough to Air Force culture that it has 
potential to withstand the test of time.  Fittingly then, this current generation of Air Force 
squadron commanders can promote the future combat capability of the organization by 
training today’s Airmen how to think systemically and see their work as connected 
processes.  If this occurs, the gains from AFSO 21 for our Nation’s Defense will be much 
further reaching than the founders of process improvement could ever have imagined. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Our Air Force exists to enhance our Nation’s ability to protect itself by providing 
sovereign options to our leaders and by being prepared to win our Nation’s wars when 
called.  This is a daunting challenge requiring tremendous leadership through out the Air 
Force to lead Airmen to reach their full potential.  As the first line of command, squadron 
commanders have the unique privilege of engaging Airmen at a personal level and 
leading them towards accomplishing the core processes and missions that make up the 
backbone of the Air Force. 
This primer into systems thinking has presented a framework for commanders to 
view their organizations and the environment around them holistically in order to better 
understand the fundamental interrelationships impacting the performance of the unit.  
While setting the direction for the squadron, commanders can maximize combat 
capabilities by aligning the processes of the unit to obtain the best possible fit amongst 
the people, tasks, structures, and technologies found in that unit.  As the unit 
accomplishes the mission, Airmen should live as organizational sensors listening to the 
feedback and cues the external environment is providing.  As situational awareness is 
developed the commander can guide the unit to adapt and change as needed to stay 
aligned and relevant.  Thankfully, Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century 
supports this framework and provides commanders an avenue to capture organizational 
learning in this quest for a continuously improving learning organization.   
Clearly, systems thinking alone is not a panacea for assured leadership success.  
As a model, however, it is a useful framework to examine the organization and its 
challenges.  As squadron commanders take a holistic, long-term view of their commands, 
the Air Force at large will be strengthened.  While the challenges of command are great, 
our Nation needs leaders willing to challenge assumptions to solve problems at their roots 
and build better organizations.  Ultimately, by applying the principles introduced in this 
paper, today’s commanders can contribute to the Force without sacrificing tomorrow’s 
strength.    Fly, Fight, and Win! 
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